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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 78-2a-3(2)(g) the Utah Court or 
Appeals has jurisdiction to hear AppellantTs appeal from an 
advei 3 Decree of Divorce and Judgment. 
NATURE OP THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiff, Laura Beth Barker (McGillivary) brought an 
action for divorce against Defendant, Michael Barker, Plaintiff 
amended her complaint. The State of Utah Department of Social 
Services joined in the amended complaint as a Plaintiff to 
recover for assistance paid by the State of Utah to Laura Barker 
for the support of the parties1 children while in her custody. 
Defendant Michael Barker responded to the amended complaint 
and has been representing himself throughout the proceedings. 
In his response to the amended complaint Michael Barker brought 
tort like allegations against the non-parties listed above. 
Michael Barker has filed many documents, which are too 
numerous to mention here, throughout the course of the divorce. 
In his documents, he has raised various motions in the District 
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Many if not 
most of his motions have revolved around asking the Courts to 
grant him special status and deny jurisdiction over him based on 
his being a "white male citizen de jure." The various motions 
at ^ach of the throe Courts have been denied. 
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Michael Barker has filed a timely appeal to this Court from 
the Decree of Divorce and the separate Order concerning the 
various pre-trial motions. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1. Does Michael Barker enjoy a special status as a "free 
white male citizen d£ jure" such that the District Court did not 
have jurisdiction over him? 
Issue 2. Is the Mexican divorce decree obtained by Michael 
Barker valid? 
Issue 3. Did the District Court properly dismiss Michael 
Barker's "tort-like" allegations and complaints against the 
non-parties? 
Issue 4. Did the District Court properly decide the issues of: 
derogatory statements by Michael Barker to his children, 
custody, support, child visitation, and real property 
distribution. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCFS 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 4 and 15 
Copied in the Addendum 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
For the nature of the case, course of proceedings, and 
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disposition in Court below see Nature of the Proceedings Below 
at page 6 above. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff/Respondent, hereafter Laura Barker, and 
Defendant/Appellant, hereafter Michael Barker, were married on 
November 4, 1975. (Transcript page 45 lines 17 through 24) 
hereafter cited as (TR pg. 45 In. 17-2*0 
Laura Barker had one child from a previous marriagp, Sarah 
Tabitha Barker born April 21, 1970, who was adopted by Michael 
Barker. The parties had four children together, Abraham Michael 
Barker, born September 19, 1976, Emily Laura Barker, Born 
December 21, 1977, Rebecca Laura Barker, born December 21, 1Q79, 
and Benjamin Michael Barker, born February 5, 1981. (TR pg. 46 
In. 4-25) 
During the course of the marriage Laura Barker was the 
primary caretaker of the children. (TR pg. 47 In. 1-2) She was 
not employed outside of the home. (TR pg. 79 In. 10-15) She was 
the one who primarily fed them, clothed them, bathed them, woke 
them, sent them to bed, sent them to school, helped them with 
their school work (TR pg. 47 in. 11-25) took them to school 
functions, took them to the doctor, took them to the dentist, 
and provided them with entertainment. (TR pg. 48 In. 1-13, pg. 
79 In. 16-19) Curing the np-riage i^ohae*1 Barker worked full 
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time (TR pg. 79 In. 20-23) and only interacted with the children 
once a week or so. (TR pg. 48 In. 14-25) The children have 
been living with Laura Barker since the parties separated. (TR 
pg. 47 In. 3-10) 
Throughout the marriage there was a substantial amount of 
physical violence between the parties during which Michael 
Barker would verbally or physically lash out at Laura Barker, 
backing her into a corner, at which point she would respond, 
becoming physically violent in return. (TR pg. 80 In. ?R to pg. 
87 In. 3) 
The parties purchased a home at 11 North 100 West, 
Mayfield, Utah in October of 1986. The purchase price was 
$20,000. They used $5,000 from the sale of Michael Barker's 
home in Portland, Oregon for the down payment. They had 
financed the remainder at $171.71 per month. At the time of the 
trial the market value of the house was $25,000, based on an 
appraisal from a year earlier. At the time of trial, there was 
an outstanding balance of $3,477. (TR pg. S8 In. 17 to 9^ In. 
23) 
The parties initially separated from April 18, to September 
30, 1984. (TR pg. 68 In. 4-9) Laura Barker went to Oregon with 
the children. 
On September 30, 1984, when she returned to Utah, Laura 
Barker signed a quit claim deed transfering the parties1 real 
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property to Gordon Beh. She signed the quitclaim because Michael 
Barker had asked her to do so. At the time she was attempting 
to reconcile with Michael Barker. Michael Barker wanted to 
transfer the title to take the property out of the reach of the 
Internal Revenue Service. There was no consideration for the 
transfer. The parties continued to reside in the home aft^r the 
transfer. Michael Barker lived there until the parties 
separated on December 25, 1984. Laura Barker and the children 
continued to live there until September, 1985. She left because 
the toilet would not work and there were problems with the water 
heater. The property was then rented, with the rent money paid 
to Gordon Beh and Gordon Beh transfering it to Michael Barker. 
(TR pg. 58 In. 17 to pg. 61 In. 10, pg. 77 In. 22 to pg. 78 In. 
15) 
Michael Barker works for St. George Mining. He grosses 
approximately $1,500 each month. (TR pg. 121 In. 24 to pg. 1?6 
In. 14) 
Laura Barker receives welfare, Aid to Families With 
Dependent Children, in the amount of $517, $50 from the Office 
of Recovery Services as a result of Michael BarkerTs payment of 
child support, and $40 working for the Work Experience and 
Training program, for a total of $607. She also receives $99 in 
food stamps for herself and her five children. (TR pg. 68 in. 16 
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to pg. 69 In. 18, pg. 112 In. 13 to pg. 113 In. Ik) (Also see 
Laura Barker's Financial Declaration Exhibit 1, attached) 
Laura BarkerTs monthly expenses as set out in her Financial 
Declaration are $963. Presumably her housing expenses will vary 
somewhat at the time she begins residing in the home in 
Mayfield. Her current rent of $31^ per month will cease. She 
will be required to make the house payments of $171 each month, 
taxes at $272.65 each year, insurance, and the normal repair and 
upkeep which are unknown amounts at this time. (Exhibit 1) (TR 
pg. 61 In. 17-22) 
At the time of trial Michael Barker's ongoing child support 
amount as assesed by the Office of Recovery services was $^00, 
which consisted of a $190 in kind payment for the house loan and 
$310 in direct payment to Laura Barker, which she turned over to 
the Office of Recovery Services and out of which she received 
$50 back. (TR pg. 137 In. 20-23, pg. 11? In. 1-3) 
On September 30, 1984, at the time the parties were trying 
to reconcile, Laura Barker signed a document pertaining to a 
Mexican Divorce Decree. It was her understanding at the time 
that the only reason for doing so was because Michael Barker 
needed the decree for Internal Revenue Purposes. As stated 
above, the parties remained living together as man and wife 
thereafter until December 25, 1984. Neither party traveled to 
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Mexico or established residency in Mexico during the course of 
their marriage. (TR pg. 102 In. 11 to pg. 104 In. 15, pg. 11? 
In. 18 to pg. 114 In. 6) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. Michael BarkerTs argument that the District Court did 
not have jurisdiction over him because he is a "free white male 
citizen <3e jure" has no merit. 
POINT II. The District CourtTs jurisdiction over the parties1 
divorce was not affected by Michael Barker's Mexican divorce 
decree. The divorce was obtained through the mail. Neither 
party had ever been to Mexico during their marriage. Laura 
Barker was never served with notice of the action. The Mexican 
decree was therefore void and was not validated by Laura Barker 
signing her name to it after it was entered by the Mexican Court. 
POINT III. The various persons not named in the Amended 
Complaint but named in Michael Barkerfs'Counterclaim were never 
properly joined. Furthermore, they could not have been joined 
in a divorce action where Michael BarkerTs complaints against 
them were "tort-like." It was therefore proper for the court to 
have dismissed the Counterclaim against them. 
POINT IV. Michael Barker1s derogatory statements about Laura 
Barker are not protected under either the Tree speech or freedom 
of religion clauses of the Utah Constitution. Freedom of speech 
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is not absolute and there is not a freedom of religion right to 
teach a child so called "morality" by making derogatory 
statements about the childfs mother. 
POINT V. Michael BarkerTs assertion that the Court adjudicated 
upon the property rights of a person not a party in the case are 
absolutely without merit. The Court specifically refused to 
make any determination as to Gordon Beh's interest in the 
parties1 real property. 
POINT VI. The Court considered Michael BarkerTs contributions 
to the parties' real property. The Court also considered Laura 
Barker's and Michael Barker's financial circumstances. The 
Court properly awarded Laura Barker all right, title and 
interest to the property. 
POINT VII. Michael Barker had very little interaction with his 
children during the marriage. Laura Barker was the primary 
caretaker. It was in the children's best interest for Laura 
Barker to be awarded the care, custody, and control of the 
parties' children. 
POINT VIII. In setting visitation, the primary criteria to be 
considered is the best interest of the children, not hardship to 
the non-custodial parent. Michael Barker had little interaction 
with his children during the parties' 12 year marriage and 
demonstrated no ability to care for them over long periods of 
-1 il-
ls ime. Summer long visitation was not in the children's best 
interest. However, shorter weekend and week long visitation was 
appropriate. 
POINT IX. Given the parties relative financial circumstances, 
Laura Barker's ongoing monthly expenses and the reduction of 
welfare benefits in one year at the time their oldest child 
turns 18, it was equitable for the Court to increase the overall 
child support by $100 at the time the parties1 oldest child 
reaches 18. 
POINT X. Michael Barker's remaining arguments are either so 
void of merit that they do not warrant response or are better 
argued in the State Respondent's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FREE WHITE MALES ARE ALSO SUBJECT 
TO THE COURT1S JURISDICTION 
Michael Barker has made numerous motions to the District 
Court, argued at trial, made motions to the Court of Appeals, 
argues as an issue In his brief and raised the argument over and 
over again that he has some kind of special status as a "free 
white male de jure" such that the District Court could not 
exercise jurisdiction over him. This argument is totally void 
of any merit. Michael Barker's arguments are similar to those 
-15-
ralsed In City of Sallna v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 98l (Utah 1Q87) 
In Wlsden the Utah Supreme Court held that the "free man" 
argument did not prevent a Utah Justice of the Peace Court from 
properly exercising jurisdiction. Michael Barker's belief that 
he is a "free white male d£ jure" in no way prevents the 
District Court from having jurisdiction over him. 
POINT II 
THE MEXICAN DIVORCE DECREE IS VOID 
Michael Barker argues that a Mexican Divorce Decree that he 
obtained prevents the District Court from entering a Utah Decree 
of Divorce. 
State Courts will not ordinarily recognize a divorce 
obtained in a foreign country, if neither spouse had a domicile 
in that country. Wells v. Wells, 230 Ala. 430, 161 So. 794 
(1935), De Young v. De Young, 27 Cal. 2d 521, 165 P.2d 457 
(1946) In Wells the Court found that the husband, who had no 
intention of residing in Mexico, made a trip there for the sole 
purpose of obtaining a divorce. The Court held that no valid 
divorce could be granted on constructive service by a nation in 
which neither party is domiciled. 
This is applicable in the instant case. Neither party has 
ever resided in Mexico. Neither party even went to Mexico 
during the marriage. The Mexican divorce was a "mail order" 
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divorce. 
California Courts have held Mexican mail order divorces 
invalid, based upon a lack of jurisdiction, Ryder v. Ryder, P 
Cal. App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1934) Du Ouesnay v. Henderson, 
24 Cal. App. 2d 11, 74 P.2d 294 (1937), and Rudnick v. Pudnlcfr, 
131 Cal. App. 2d 227, 280 P.2d 96 (1955) Other states have 
ruled similarly. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 287 Mass 524, 1Q2 NF, 86 
(1934), Re Petition of Chong Jah Alix, 252 P. Supp 313 (DC 
Hawaii 1965), and Greenspan v. Greenspan, 19 NJ Misc. 153, 18 
A.2d 283 (1941) A new Jersey Court held mail order divorces 
lack "even colorable validity" and are utterly void. State v^ 
Najjar, 1 N.J. Super. 208, 63 A.2d 807, aff'd per curiam 2 N.J. 
208, 66 A.2d 37 (1949) Najjar affirmed a conviction for bigamy 
holding that the Mexican mail order decree had no validity and 
could not be used as a defense to bigamy. 
Mexico lacked subject matter jurisdiction since the 
Barker's marriage did not occur in Mexico, nor did the parties 
even travel to Mexico during their marriage. 
Mexico also lacked personal jurisdiction since neither 
party ever lived in Mexico, established any kind of residency in 
Mexico, nor traveled to Mexico during the marriage and Laura 
Barker was never served or made aware of the proceedings until 
after they were final. 
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Michael Barker has argued in his brief that Laura Barker 
signed some form of a document that resulted in her submitting 
herself to the jurisdiction of the Mexican court. The document 
was not submitted into evidence. Michael Barker testified and 
indicated in his questions to Laura Barker at trial that he felt 
she had signed a divorce decree. Laura Barker testified that 
she had understood that the document she signed was a consent of 
some kind. She also testified that she signed the document on 
September 30, 1984, the day she returned from Oregon after the 
parties six month separation. She testified that she signed the 
document at Michael Barker's request and understood that he 
wanted to obtain a divorce only for purposes of his dealings 
with the Internal Revenue Service. She testified that the 
parties were reconciling and she signed the document so as not 
to cause problems with the reconciliation. However, at the time 
she signed it she did not think they were being divorced and in 
fact they continued to live together as man and wife until they 
separated on December 25, 1984. (TR pg. 102 In. 11 to pg. 104 
In. 15, pg. 113 In. 18 to pg. 114 In. 6) 
While not in evidence, copies of the Mexican divorce decree 
in Spanish and English are being attached in the addendum. If, 
for some reason, the Court should find it necessary to remand 
this issue for further fact finding, Laura Barker proffers that 
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these documents will be found to be the Mexican divorce decree 
in question. As can be seen from the face of the English 
translation of the divorce decree, Laura Barker did sign that 
document on September ^0, 1984. The documents indicate that the 
divorce had been granted on August 3, 1984, on the supposed 
default of Laura Barker. Her signature to a divorce decree 
could in no way validate a decree already void for lack or 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 
POINT III 
MICHAEL BARKER'S TORT-LIKE CLAIMS 
WERE PR0PFRL7 DISMISSED 
Michael Barker argues that the District Court acted 
improperly in dismissing the non-parties (David L. Wilkerson, 
Utah Attorney General, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County 
Attorney, John Abbott, Roleen Olsen, The Utah Office of Recovery 
Services, Utah Legal Services, Inc., Waine Riches, Clella 
Lawrence, and the Honorable Howard Maetani (hereafter called 
non-parties)). 
However, Michael Barker did not make any motion whatsoever 
to join the non-parties. Furthermore, even had Michael Barker 
attempted to join the non-parties, the court had only limited 
statutory jurisdiction in the divorce action under Utah Code 
Ann. 30-3-1 et. seq., 78-45-1 et. seq. and 78-45d-l et seq. and 
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could not have joined the non-parties to defend against 
"tort-like" allegations and complaints. The Utah Supreme Court 
in Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983) found that a divorce 
action is highly equitable without a right to trial by jury and 
tort actions are at law and may well involve a request for trial 
by jury. The Court held that: "The administration of justice 
will be better served by keeping the two proceedings separate." 
Id. at 1291. 
POINT IV 
DEROGATORY REMARKS ARE NEITHER MORAL NOR PROTECTED 
BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Michael Barker argues that the Court's order that he not 
make derogatory statements about Laura Barker in front of the 
children somehow violates his right to free speech and religious 
freedom under the Utah Constitution. He is unable to cite any 
authority whatsoever in support of his argument. 
As stated in his brief, Michael Barker seeks to teach his 
children certain "moral" values through making derogatory 
statements about Laura Barker. This is at best a strange and 
twisted concept for teaching morality. To allow Michael Barker 
to say things to his children that denegrate Laura Barker 
results In the children being used as tools in an irrational 
battle where the only possible real goal Is to hurt Laura 
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Barker. In reality, however, it is much more likely that such 
action will result in harm to Michael Barker's children. 
Freedom of speech is not absolute. For example, minors are 
protected from harmful speech through such laws as Utah Code 
Ann. 78-10-1201 et. seq. (See e.g. State v. Burke, 67S P.2d 
1198 (Utah 1983) upholding the constitutionality of the 
statute.) Article I Section 15 of the Utah Constitution does 
not sanction or allow Michael Barker to inflict harm on his own 
children through derogatory remarks about their mother. It was 
proper for the Court to prohibit such remarks. 
Michael Barker can point to no protected religious right to 
teach a child so called morality by denegrating that childTs 
mother. Article I Section 4 of the Utah Constitution does not 
allow this. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ADJUDICATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS OP A NON-PARTY 
Michael Barker argues that the District Court adjudicated 
upon the property rights of a person not a party In the case. 
He does not Indicate whose property rights he feels were 
adjucated. 
In its findings and order concerning the parties' real 
property the Court awarded Laura Barker uall of the parties' 
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right, title and interest" in the property. (TR pg. 211 In. 
24-25) The property had earlier been quitclaimed by the parties 
to Gordon Beh, not a party to the divorce. With reference to any 
rights Godon Beh might have in the property the Court stated: 
I am awarding the Plaintiff the parties1 home and she will 
assume any debt obligation on that. Of course, she has got 
to get it first, and that's between her and Mr. Beh at this 
point. ThatTs not before me and I won't rule on Mr. BehTs 
rights because I donTt know if he has any rights. 
(TR pg.219 In.1-5) 
As can be seen, the Court specifically did not make a 
ruling as to Gordon Beh's rights in the property. Michael 
Barker's assertions that the Court did do so are frivolous. 
POINT VI 
THE REAL PROPERTY AWARD WAS PROPER 
Michael Barker argues that in awarding Laura Barker the 
parties' home, the Court did not consider the $5000 from the 
sale of a home that he owned prior to the marriage. The $5,000 
was used as down payment on the parties' home in Mayfield, Utah. 
However, the Court was fully aware of the $5,000. (See TR pg. 58 
In. 25 to pg. 59 In. 4 Laura Barker testifying: "0 Was there a 
down payment on that? A $5,000. Q Where did that money come 
from? A Prom a down payment from a home that he had in 
Portland, Oregon.") (And see TR pg. 116 In.10-13 "THE COURT: But 
in answer to your question, I can answer your question because 
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she already testified that you got a down payment from a house 
you owned in Oregon, See, I understand that now. That's why I 
have been listening.) 
It is unclear what issue Michael Barker is trying to raise 
with regards to the home. While, as stated above, he argues 
that the Court did not consider the proceeds from his property 
in Oregon, in his brief under paragraph 6 page 36 he asks that 
"the Court order Respondant/Plaintiff to live in the Mayfield 
home as per the parties mutual agreement pursuant to the foreign 
divorce decree." Under Point 20 on page 32 he indicates that he 
made the home available to Laura Barker and their children and 
Laura Barker made some kind of a bargain contracting away her 
rights. However, whatever his contention, the award was within 
the equity powers of the Court. 
In Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982) the Utah 
Supreme Court held that property acquired prior to the marriage 
by the husband could be considered as marital assets to be 
divided at the time of divorce. In Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 
338 (Utah 1980) the Court held that the title to marital 
property prior to the parties1 divorce was not binding on the 
trial Court's distribution. These cases are both cited in 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Filed November 13, 
1987) where the court held that "the overriding consideration 
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is that the ultimate division be equitable—that property be 
fairly divided between the parties, given their contributions 
during the marriage and their circumstances at the time of the 
divorce." Id. at 33. (emphasis added) At Michael Barker's 
insistance, Laura Barker did not work outside of the home during 
the marriage and therefore did not contribute actual money 
towards the house payments. Nevertheless, as a traditional 
housewife she did make an equal contribution toward the marriage. 
More importantly, the parties1 circumstances at the time of 
the divorce were so different, that the award of the home to 
Laura Barker was proper as a means of resolving some of the 
difference. Michael Barker has the greater earning capacity 
between the parties. His gross income is $1,500 a month. Fven 
with a child support order of $500 a month he is left with 
$1,000 for one person. Laura Barker is on welfare and has a 
total income of $706, if food stamps are included as income. 
She is only able to earn $40 a month at her employment, which is 
part of the welfare grant. She is supporting a family of six on 
that income, including herself and the parties' five children. 
Michael Barker is not paying any alimony to Laura Barker. 
The Court specifically found that "in view of the number of 
children involved and the lack of earning power of the Plaintiff 
that all of the parties1 interest in that home should be awarded 
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to her so that the children will have a place to live." (TP 
pg.212 In.11-15) The Court's decision was proper and well 
within its equitable powers. 
POINT VII 
THE CUSTODY AWARD WAS PROPFR 
Michael Barker argues that the award of custody o^ the 
children to Laura Barker was an abuse of discretion. 
In making a custody award the court must be concerned with 
the best interest of the children. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 64Q 
P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) The Hutchison Court set out some of the 
criteria to be used in determining best interest. In Pusey v^ 
Pusey, 40 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Filed August 18, 1986) the Utah 
Supreme Court further clarified the criteria, listing several 
factors for determining child custody, the most important of 
which was the identity of the primary caretaker parent during 
the marriage. 
The evidence at trial was that Laura Barker was the primary 
caretaker of the children throughout the marriage. She fed, 
bathed, clothed, entertained, took care of when ill and did all 
of the other responsibilities for the children that a primary 
caretaker does. Michael Barker?s Interaction with the children 
was minimal at best, interacting with them only once a week. In 
addiuion, the children have lived with Laura Barker since their 
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birth, including during both of the parties1 separation periods. 
Currently, Laura Barker has the greater amount of time to spend 
with the children. Under the criteria set out in Hutchison and 
Pusey it was proper for the Court to award her custody. 
POINT VIII 
THE VISITATION ORDER WAS PROPER 
Michael Barker argues that the Courtfs order of only two 
weeks visitation in the summer and every other weekend was too 
restrictive. He argues that the Court should consider his 
financial situation and the distance he has to travel for 
visitation and allow him to have the children throughout their 
entire summer break. 
However, the proper criteria in setting visitation is not 
Michael Barker's hardship, but what Is in the children1s best 
interest. See e.g. Ebbert v. Ebbert, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 42 
(Piled November 3, 1987) The record reflects that Michael 
Barker had only minimal interaction with his children throughout 
the marriage. He occassionally helped them with their homework 
and played with them. (TR pg. 47 In. 23 to pg. 48 In. 22) There 
Is no indication that he performed or has the ability to perform 
any of the responsibilities of primarily taking care of the 
children over lengthy periods of time — functions that were 
done exclusively by Laura Barker during the marriage. After 
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paying little attention to his children during the 12 year 
marriage, there is little reason he will do so now. Allowing 
summer long visitation would therefore not be in the best 
interest of the children. However, maintaining contact with 
their father through shorter weekend visitation and two, 
two-week periods in the summer is more in line with Michael 
Barker's past record and ability to interact effectively with 
his children, thus making the visitation better for the 
children. The CourtTs visitation Order is in the children!s 
best interest and should be upheld. 
POINT IX 
THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD WAS PROPER 
Michael Barker argues that he Is being penalized for his 
children reaching the age of 18 because the Court has ordered an 
increase of child support at the time the first child reaches 
18. He also argues that there has not been a change of 
circumstances to warrant such an Increase. 
Michael Barker's reliance on cases that require a change o^ 
circumstances to modify or make new awards of child support is 
misplaced. There is no such requirement for making new orders. 
Furthermore, at the time the support is increased, the Court 
will not be modifying an existing order nor creating a new one 
where no support had existed before. 
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Instead, the Court is setting a contingency in its present 
order for an increase of support for the remaining four children 
at a point in time when the support for the fifth child 
terminates. The overall support will only increase by $100, 
leaving Michael Barker with a far superior income for one person 
($900) than Laura Barker will have for five ($806 less the 
amount her welfare grant and food stamps will be reduced because 
the oldest child is no longer eligible.) 
The increase is a rational one. Laura Barker's welfare 
grant and food stamps will be reduced at the time the oldest 
child reaches 18 in approximately one year. The major expenses 
for housing, utilities, food and transportation will not 
decrease significantly with one child turning 18, even if the 
child moves out of the home. However, the expenses for the 
remaining four children will increase as the four children 
become older. With $500 per month child support, Laura Barker's 
present income is not sufficient to pay her monthly expenses of 
$963. Even if she moves into the parties home, there will be 
some savings, possibly as much as $144 if the upkeep and 
repairs, taxes and insurance on the home are not considered. 
Nevertheless, her expenses will still exceed her present income. 
There is no indication that Michael Barker cannot meet his 
monthly expenses with a gross income of $1,500 and child support 
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at the present $500 or the higher $600. 
Given the relative financial positions of the parties, the 
number of children living with Laura Barker, her expenses, and 
the pending reduction of income as a result of the loss of 
welfare for the oldest child, the increase in child support in 
one year is reasonable. 
POINT X 
MICHAEL BARKERfS REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARK EITHER 
SO VOID OP MERIT THAT THEY DO MOT WARRANT RESPONSF, 
Oa ARE BETTER ARGUED IN THE BRIEF BY THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONCLUSION 
Laura Barker respectfully asks that Michael Barkerfs appeal 
be dismissed In Its entirety and that he take nothing thereby. 
She also asks that she be awarded reasonable attorneyTs fees. 
Respectfully submitted this *?t* day December, 19^7. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By Waine Riches 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
MEXICAN DIVORCE DECREE, SPANISH AND ENGLISH COPIES. 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION OF LAURA BARKER 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTIONS H AND IS 
EXHIBIT A 
o 
CM 
^s t abcg ^lutbos ^ B X t e a nog 
That in the Docket Numhen^m 
( E t i i t l OH o u r t o f FIRST ^ I n s t a n c e 
CITY OF "VILLAHERMOSA" 
STATE OF " TABASCO " 
REPUBLIC OF MEXICO 
Jf.i it a4 j3 i li-a r c c l u r e c -
P L A I N T I F F 
MR MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER. 
D E F E N D A N T 
M R S . LAURA BETH McGILLIYRAY BARKER. 
Judge: HON, JAVIER TORRES CASTRO. ATTY AT LAW. 
Clerk: AUSEUCIO ZURITA LOPEZ. 
1$ T W <h Date Filed: J U L Y ^ Y / l ^ 
! ' % Date Granted: AUGUST 3 / l 9 8 4 
{s}<M \\ 566 
?:iipo 13E rnivsRA I ^ T / U C I A CIVIL DE ESTA CIUDAD DE VILLAHERKOSA, 
N
 E^ADO DE TABASCO, REPURLTCA r/MxiJA^A. 
- 1 C E R T I F I C A : 
Qu£*en lo s a u t e j .1*1 Quicio d^ d ivo rc io nuo promovi6 ante e s t e -
Jufcgado, e l seilor WICHAliL ROBERT BARKER, en cont^ c de su esposa, 
1.. c : : : r . TATTT>A " ? * ' ,^nrZZZ'r\Ar ^AR" R, ohr-? unj c n t e n c i a de-
bidaraente e j e c u t o r i a d a del t e n o r l i t e r a l si{cruiente. 
l ' 4 / ? 3 / . . 5SJFTJNCIA;- VillahcrmOoa, Tabssco, a v e m t i s i e t e de j u l i o de — 
mx\ novecient^G oohcrita y c u c t r o , 
A u , " " ^ \ v I s T 0 Z. p'-ra r- s o l v e r en d e f i n i t i v e l o s autos -
. :\\ 
dpi presente juicio de divorcio; y 
^ E S U I ^ A H D O : 
l / o . - C?u? sorq->tie'ndo.~e pypre"?7i« n t e ? lc j u r i s d i ' j c i 6 n y compe -
t e n c i a de e s t e Jus^ado, e l i e~or MCHAEL R0~lTiT r'uu'AR, por :on 
duqto de S'i Apoderdo ^ u r i d i c ", o*1 3^"or L i c c ' i n c l o J03^ CRUZ -
RU3J2, projeito* demanaa de d ivo rc io en c o n t r a de su esposa,4* l a -
se r iora LAURA PET! KeOITLIYRAY "AITCR, manife^tando oue c o n t r a -
je rpn matrimomo en Sa l t Lake Ci ty , U tah . ,U .S .A. , con feeha cua 
trcf de novieiabre de mil novec ien to3 se t ea ta y c inco ; y que duran 
t e jsu v ida conyu^al a d q u i r i c r o ^ b ienes ya hubo convemo sobre l a s 
misjma? proniedades ^ nroorearon oinco h i303 , l o s que l l e v a n l o s -
nonlbres de Sarah Tabstha ^prker , Abraham Yichael Pa rke r , Emily — 
Laiira Barker, Rebecca Laura Brrker y Benjamin Michael Barker , t o -
"D3 "l^r^r : de odrd y 1i T X ^ M r1^ V ° ^onbr.^ ^ hi . ja lefalrncntc 
adopt?da, todo j cs \ i ; p c nc.i-ioni'dos -uodaran br jo l a cuc tod ia -
de lamboc n a 3 r e s ; a^regando el oromovenle que l a c6nyu£e demandada 
ha (tratado con c rue l da* mental a su esposo, -)0r l o nue se encuen-
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O 
^59 0 0 : 
t r a n separados desde e l di^ciocho de a b r i l dkl sao en cu r -
es hac ta l a press-»it e fecha e i for.ua eonsecu t iva , 
2/o.-j<Se di6 en t rada a l a demanja y se mandd a cmplazar a-
l a dc)man3ada en l a forma que l a ley prevjaie; y t r ' n s c u r n -
do el] ltd? ramo del c* "»lar<m:iaito qin que hubie^a c o n i e s t a — 
ci6n, \a s o l i c i t u d de 1? p r t e a c t o r a se tuvo por a c u ^ d a -
l a c o r r £ : ; o n i n 5 n L - r ^ b c l d i a y jf a b n 6 e l j u i c i o a praeba. 
3 /o . -Durante e l pprlodo probato^io inica , i r \ i tb I'" ~-~rte ac -
t o r a q i r e c i ^ co no ZA? p r v „ l o c , 1-. T"C J r 'x "TAL, con l ' j t ^ . t e -
en 10s documentor que ac 0 Tpafi6 ^ l a demands; l a CCITT, ,„JIO -
?!AL, i s l a demand?da, a l tenor de l a s pos ic iones cue l e — 
fuer^n a r t i c u l ada^-j l a i r ^ P U I ^ T A L , de l a s a^ tuac icnes j u -
d i c i a l e c y l a PRL3UNCI0KAL, le£>l y humanr y en su opor tu -
mdacj se c e l e b r 6 l a aud ienc ia de a l ega too , q^edando c i t a y ^ 
das Ids p a r t e 3 para o i r senter .c ia ; y »• 
I .~ lU c : r ' r c t 3 n c i a d^ e3 tc Jy?
 c i : kra conofcer v f r U " r e l 
pr3sc?ntc j u i c i o , ;iudx; 1-^almente ' s t a b l e c i d a con l a °um -
s i6n expresa de' l a pai^te ° c to ra dA conformidkd con lo d i s -
puesio cor l o s c r t f c u l o s 135* 1**4 y ISO de l p6di£0 de Proce. 
dimi^ntos C i v i l e 0 . ' 
I I , - *£a pe r sona l i sed de l 'Vardatnno J u r i d i o o de l a c t o r , s e -
j u ^ t l f i c 6 e.x autoc con e l t ^ s t i n o n i o de l Fod,er Lspccikl 0 -
tornado a su favor , «uito l a fe" de un Notr.rioi Pu I I J C y l a -
e x i s t e n c i a d e l i i a t r i nonio cuya d i c o l u : i 6 n sej s o j i c i t a , qued6 
igualmente j u s t i f i c a d o con e l c e r t i f i c a d o re tspect ivo, docu -
nentos que obran en autos y que hacen pruebsf p lena , se^un lo 
d is ronen l o s a r t icc i lo^ 101* Prrccf6n VII y 51(9 de l a Ley ^ r o -
c e s a l C i v i l an te 3 i n v o c d a . ' 
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Ho jaT*lMmero dos. . . 
III.- La deraanda so f'mda en la crueldad Tieiitsl con que la cdnyu-
*e denan3ada trsta. a s.i esposo y en la separaoi6n desde el di^cio. 
cho {le abril del ano en curco hcsfca la oresente fecha en forma — 
conubcuiiva, caucles de divoi^io cue se encusr.tr:'n previstas en-
el artfculo 206 del^Cddi^o Cjvil Vicente y due se pro1 aron en le-
rsil forma con lacp ruebns ant^n onunciadas 2f ^ e m-ncta especial -
con Jfes confesi6n ficta de la misma demandada, atenla la declara-
ci6n judicial que la tuvo por confesa en las posijiones que le — 
fueron ^rticulada*-, en e~a virtud es precedente receiver declarer^ 
do d^suelto el m~trimonio de oue se trata y dejando a los c6nyu -
5es qn actitud de contraer nuevpc nupcins, ejecutoriado que sea -
el pijesente lallo y los menorec hijos del roatriTionio quedardn ba-
30 la cuctodia de uuhos iadres y la esposa recoilara su norrcre de 
rollera. r-
Tcr 1c oyuiec tc y fundado y con ap 'yo en lo a r t l c ^ l o s 561, 564 , -
5?2 y| i r e l a t i v o s de l 06dirc r e Frocediraien t o o ' C i v i l e e , es de f a l l a r 
se y se f e l l a : J 
PRP'IRO:- Ha procodido l e f r lmen tc e r t e juici$> de d i v o r c i o en e l — 
ciuil l e per l e cc to rp prob<5 ru rcci6^_ y l a p a r t e dernandada no con -
t c r t 6 l a demt-nda n i cpuso exce . ' c iones . 
SEOUIipOi- \!e dec l s r r de f in i t i v rn . cn l e d i r r c . l t o P1 rrr tr imonio que ccn 
t r r j e r o n : IJICHAFL PXT,:riT r / .R '^ . y I AURA PYTK KcGILJIVRAY BARK2?, en 
3 a l t Lake C i ty , Utah , , U.S.A., con feclio cuc t ro de novienbre de mil 
nove^ ien tor r.ettr. le y c m c c . 
TLRCEftC:- Los c6nyu£cs mencioncdoj -redan en iac t i tud l e ^ o l de con -
t r a c r fruevss n u p c i c s , o^eca tor iadc rue sea e l p r e s e n t s f a l l o y l a -
espoc i recoLr^ra ru nomVre de s e l l e r ? . t 
CUAP.TO:- Los racnorcc h i j o s de l rr-trjmonio perfnanecer&n en cusfeodia 
561 
de aniLo'- 'padres* -
XUI1JC:- Pouf '^ucse. —» 
A3I, ^of ir lw-vnnente juzccudo lc sonJenci<5 y finja el Cu'n£ 
dario LicrficiGco Jcvici ?6rres Castro, Juez del Juzjr^o r~~-
rrero de Drimpra Ir-iieu caa Civ:l de csta Ciud-d, ente su "c-
cr»tu*.i: R«. : u i ' 2 i u . - Doy fe . - J . - T.- Cac t r c - ' . - Zn~i-
ta L6t>C7.H Rubric as, 
V i l k h . r ^ c , T i ^ : c : , c t i : *c . b " , «u de Till no /cc ient„-
ccr-^n'a y''cuatro. 
Fabs'^dL +rcrpDirri(^ P*1 t c rnno l r £" l cir r>uc s^ intcrp rn-
£0 mnp-un recurrc en ccntr? de lc ^entcnci? que antecede, -
c~no zc ^i^e y c~ •» fare's vento en los art£c^los 584 Frs^cifn 
II y 566 del C*di^ ~ do ^roccdi^icntoc Civil^c, se declare; -
Cjccui cri{:ida y e r "tcce^ ?~\ ^ro^rventu lc co^ia cer irif icrr c -
^ , - ^ i i c p r . - r r ' , 1 ' •c^ . f i z «. c3 r ) i u ^ ' r c i i r > 'J ez ^ r 
Ju££?do Pirirrero de Pn^r ra Inslancia Civil de esija Cu^id.-
Doy fe \ - J . - T.- Castro.- A.-Zjnta Ldpez.- Rubrjcas.. r 
Y EN ClTfflLIHILIiTO DE LC ORDENADO POR EL CIUDADATCJ JUEZ, SE-^ 
EXUDE 3A| P R E S E n ^ C C P I A CERIIFICADA EF DCS HOJAS U T I I I 3 , -
1/3 T ^ T£ET r n -n i r ro v / i O u LEG.I FR<^AT^FI<^ PAHA 103 D3Co -
TTtC r 5 T7J05 H P J Z ^ I ""E ILEY'R EL . S J - L O Y LA FIRhA A PULC Y-
LETRA DEL 5FCRFTARI0 DEL JUZCrAD^ T J F RO DE PRII^RA I I . - W C I A 
CIVIL DL E3TA CIUDAD r I V7TIAK .R^OSA, r3TAD0 DElfA~/3C0, Pi ,-
PUBLICA I/TXICAKA, A LOS TPE3 DIAS DEL 'TES DE AG05T0 DE n i l -
^ r ^ ^ f ^ M ^ } (srtt^r^m^ v rjuATRO. -t~ 
EI SECR^TARIC: 
IJJvSrZlQ^miUL ICPLZ.-
Conferee *[* LI CiuMar^ Juc? del 2\i?rzdo Fnmeroj£e Prif-rc* -
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c 
01 
In. 'traicia C i v i l de e s t a Ciudad de Villfeherncsa, *<stado 
de Tabasco, Republica Mexicana.- En la |misina fecha y ~ 
aflo.- Conste . 
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( TRANSLATION ) 
Certified Copy of Final Divorce Decree 
THE CITIZEN, AUSEf4CI0 ZURITA LOPEZ, CLERK OF THE FIRST CIVIL COURT OF THIS CITY 
OF VILtAHERMOSA, 
C E R T I F I E S 
STATE OF TABASCO, REPUBLIC OF MEXICO, - -i - - - - -
: That in the file for divorce instituted before this Court 
by Mr. MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, aqainst his wife, Mrs. LAURA BETH McGILLIVRAY -
BA?KER, there is a duly executed sentence reading as follows: - - - - - - - -
File 144/984 SENTENCE: "VILLAHERMOSA, Tabasco, JULY TWENTY SEVENTH, NINETEEN 
HUNDRED AND) EIGHTY FOUR. 
HAVING HEARD, for final resolution on the actions of the present suit 
for divorce; and, IN CONSEQUENCE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ -
1st. That expressely submittinq himself to the competence and juris-
diction of this Court, Mr.MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, through his juridical -
empouered leqally recoqnizzd in actions, Atty. JOSE CRUZ RUIZ, institut-
ed divorce suit aqainst Mrs. LAURA BETH McGILLIVRAY BARKER, declarinq -
that the marriage was entered in SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, U.S.A., on Novem-
i 
ber 4th, 1975, that the property acquired has been mutually settled and 
that five sons were born, bearing the names of SARAH TABITHA BARKER, ABR>\ 
HAM MICHAEL BARKER, EMILY LAURA BARKER, REBECCA LAURA BARKER and BENJAMIN 
! 
MICHAEL BARKER, all minors living under the joint cutsotiy of both parents 
^nd declared that the first of the abovementioned daughters is adppted le-
qally and declared qrounds of MENTAL CRUELTY inflicted by the defendant 
to the extent that they have been separated since April 18th of this year 
to this date. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2nd. The, suitwas entered and the defendant summoned to contest same ac_ 
cording to the ^aw, which action was not contested 'by her so was consid-
ered contested in the neqative sense and the suit was open to declarations. 
3rd.During the leqal period the plaintiff rendered his sole declarat-
ions as proif: the DOCUMENTS, the INSTRUMENTAL, the CONFESSIONAL by the -
defendant in the positioner that were articulated and the PRESUPPOSITIONAL, 
10 
O 
legally recognized in 
issued in his favor 
legal and human, finally the hearing of petitions was held and the parties 
were summoned^o hear sentence; and, CONSIDERING - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I. That the comoetence and jurisdiction of this Court to hear and ren-
der judgement in the present suit wasJLeqally established with the exoress 
submission of the plaintiff to this Jurisdiction and, in accordance with 
articles 139,144,180 of the CODE OFCIVIL PROCEDURES. 
II. The Juridical empowered of the plaintiff was 
actions through the notarized power of attorney fornj 
and the marriaqe was confirmed by means of the marriage certificate exhib-
ited, which I documents are on file and constitute legal proof, as prewcrib-
ed in articles 401 fraction VII and 519 of the above ORDINANCE. - - - - -
III. Thaj: this suit is based on grounds of MENTAL CRUELTYinflicted by 
the defendant and a consecutive separation since April 18th of this year, 
orounds spectified in article 206 of the present CIVIL CODE and duly proven, 
especially throuqh the t^cit confession by the defendant in the positions 
that were articulated *nd in that virtue, it is proper to resolve and de-
clare_the bonds of matrimony dissolved, qrantinq both parties leqal antit-
ude to contract new matrimony once this verdict is duly executed, the chij^ 
dren will remain under joint custody of both parents and the wife reqains 
her maiden hame. - - - - - - rp/r* ~" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In view of the above, based£n articles 561,564,572 of the CODE OF CI-
VIL PROCEDURES, it is hereby resolved. - v 
FIRST: This suit was processed in all its leqalfprms with the plaint-
iff provinq his action and the defendant abstaininn from contest or any 
form of objections. - ~ ~ - - ~ - - ~ - . - - - - - . - - . - - - . _ - - . - - . -
SECOND: The marriage contracted by Mr. MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER and LAURA 
BE^H McGILLIVRA/ BARKER, in Salt Lake City, Utah, U.S.A., on November 4, 
1975 is hereby declared definitely dissolved. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
THIDD: Both parties are qranted leqal aptitude to contract ne-v matri-
mony once this verdict is duly executed and the wife reqains her maiden 
n a m e , - — - — - — — — - — — — — — - — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
FOURTH: The minors will remain under joint custody of BOTH PARENTS. -
FIFTH: ALL PARTS BE NOTIFIED. - . _ _ - - - - . - -
i 
THUS, definitely judged it was sentenced and signed by the Citizen, 
Atty. JAVIER TORRES CASTRO, Judqe of First Instance of this Cit/ before 
h . Clerk, who authori7es. I ATTEST".J.T.CASTRO.,A.ZURITA LOPEZ.,SIG\ATURES 
"VIILAHERMOSA, Tabasco, AUGUST THIRD, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FOUR. 
No objections havinq beeni_nternosed within the legal period of this -
sentence, as requested, based on articles 584 fraction II and 586 of the 
CODE OF CIVIL£ROCEDURES, it is declared duly executed and certified copies 
issued as requested. THUS, aontoved
 and signed by the CitizenJudqe. I AT-
TEST". J.T.CASTRO., A.ZURITA LOPEZ, SIGNATURES'*, 
AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ORDAINED BY THE CITIZENJUDGE, THE PRESENT 
CERTIFIED COPY IS ISSUED IN TWO LFGAL SHEETS, \ HIGH CONSTITUTE LEGAL PROOF 
FOR THE LEGAL PURPOSES IT MAY SERVE, AS IT BEARS ThJE SEAL AND SIGNATURE 
OF THL COURT CLERK OF THIS CITY OF VT LLAHERMOSA,STATE OF TABASCO,REPUBLIC 
OF MEXICO, ON AUGUST THIRD, NTNETCEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FOUR. -
COURT SEAL THECOURT CLERK 
(stamped) (siqnature) 
^USCNCIO ZURI^ LOPEZ 
IS^J^DJITH THE APPROVAL O^ THL JUDGE OF FUST INSTANCE OF THIS CITY OF 
VILLAHERMOSA, STATE OF TABASCO, REPUBLIC OF MEXICO J ON THE ABOVE DATE 
ANO YEAR. I ATTEST". Atty. JAVILR TORR:S CASTRO. (SIGNATURE) 
i 
( I CERTIFY, THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND EX^CT TRANSLATION FROM THE 
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
IN AND FOR COUNTY 
~ Plaintiff 
vs. 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Civil No. 
Defendant 
Husband: 
Address: 
Soc. Sec. No: 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Birthdate: 
W i f e :
 Laura HQ^U {hcxCk?r 
Address : 1 I £ Csyrlfr ^4 ->% 
Soc. Sec . No: S ^ l -G4 -?6> ^O 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Birthdate: A^Cilst^ ^ /*>^/ 
~t 
NOTE: This declaration must be filed before or at the time of the hearir 
Failure by either party to complete, present, and file this form a 
required will authorize the Court to accept the statement of the 
other party as the basis for its decision. Any false statement ma 
hereon shall subject you to the penalty for perjury and may be 
considered a fraud upon the Court. 
STATEMENT OP INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
Attach copies of State and Federal Income Tax Returns 
for last tr taxable years and wage statements from 
your employer for last 8 weeks. 
Gi oss monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including commission, bonuses, 
allowances and overtime. Payable 
Pay period . 
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly income figure if paid 
weekly, multiply weekly income by 4.3: if paid 
bi-weekly income by 2.15) 
Pensions and retirement 
Social security 
HUSBAND WIPE 
Disability and unemployment insurance _ , _ 
Public assistance (welfare, APDC payments, etc.) 
Child support from any prior marriage ^J 
Dividends and interest 
Rents 
WBAT 
40 
I j ^ / 1 
All other sources (specif y)(J^)r} ^A^-fL- c*£)+r O^ 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 
^VnM 3 
-5LS 
OS 
(o 0 7 
PAGE 2 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income: 
State and federal income taxes 
Number of exemptions taken 
Social security 
Medical or other insurance (describe fully) 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund j 
Savings plan 
Credit union ! 
Other (specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS i 
Net monthly Income—take home pay 
Debts and obligations: 
Creditor's Name FOR DATE PAYABLE 
1 HUSBAND 
BALANCE 
^ 
1 WIFF 
% 
GO 7 
MONTH 
PAYMF 
/7! . ' 
(If insufficient space, insert; total and attach schedule) 
All property of the parties known to be owned individually or join 
(Indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband (W) Wife or 
(J) Jointly) 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture, appliances 
and equipment 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) 
CuZV 
VALUE OWE 
THERE 
$ 
il 
/ Jl 
12 
(c) Securities - stocks - bonds 
Co 06 n 
(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savins & loans, 
credit unions - savings and check 
PAGE 3 
(e) Life Insurance: 
Name of Company Policy No, Pace Amount 
Cash Value 
Accumulated 
or Loan Amou 
$ $ 
(f) Profit Sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name 
Value of interest a 
Amount presently ve 
Name 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (Specify) 
(h) Real Estate (where more than one parcel of real estate owned, 
attach sheet with identical information for all additional 
property) 
Address // AJ fQQ \J S S M 
Original Cost 
Cost of Additions 
Total Cost 
Mortgage Balance 
Other Liens 
Equity 
Monthly Amortization 
Taxes 
Individual contributions 
$ ; 
f IX 0, QO 0 
$ < 477 
Type of Property ^ cr^ -e <v^ A c 
Date of Acquisition Qo ArK?r7"< 
Total Present Value $^X ,T. OOP 
Basis of Valuation c<>nr^,-<^) 
I ,5""^  1> And to whom $ ' 
$ 
(i) Business Interest (Indicate name, share, type of business, vali 
less indebtedness) 
(j) Other Assets (specify) 
PAGE 4 
6, Total monthly expenses: (Specify which party Is the custodial paren 
and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose 
expenses are included). ^ 
J- 5fr<rftU ) c k J V (7V) 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) _ _ _ _ I 
Rent property taxes (residence) ~~ \ 
Real property insurance (residence)_"""""_ "~~~ i 
Maintenance (residence) _ _ 171.-~ JL_ „J 
Food and household supplies" ' * ~~ '"" ~~ " 1 
HUSBAND 
Utilities including water, electricity, gas, and 
heat ^ ___ _ __ 
Telephone 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothing ~ 
Me d i c a 1 " _J" 
Dental 
Insurance (life, health, accident, comprehensive, 
disability) Exclude payroll deduct<jd__ 
Child care 
Payment of child/spousal support re prior marriage 
School 
Entertainment (include 
travel, recreation) 
^ U' iubs, social obligations, 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, 
donations, including tithing) 
Transportation (other than automobTfeT
 r__ 
Auto expenses (gas , o i l , rcpal r ,3 j nsur 'arce ) <iy/;!(\y^cOtl 
Auto payments 
Installment payments ("insert total and attach 
itemized schedule if not fully set forth in (d)_ 
Other expenses (insert total and specify on 
attached sheet) 
JL \J 1 /-*ij 2ijL\. x Zt n O Hi O 
VJIPE 
1 ) 5' 
0 
% Ft 
J^JL 
A 
la. 
-s: 
QJc 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing, including any 
attachments, is true and correct and that this declaration was executed 
the ^ C * * day of A l ^ o l i _, !9<T7_, at 
(Plaintiff or Defendant) Attorney's Signature Party's Signatu 
BRING TO THE HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO PASSBOOKS, CHECK BOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS, 
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES, AND OKIE?. DOCUMENTATION. 
UTAH CODE 
1987 1988 Constitution of Ut**h 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PRLAMBi L v 
AU1ICLI I DI CI ARATION OF RIGHTS 
ARTICI* II STA1LBOUNDARYS 
A R l I C I L f l l ORDIN\NCF 
ARIICLI IV FLLCIION^. AM) RIGHT Or SUFFRAGE 
ART IC1 E > DISTRIBUTION OF VOW FRS 
ARTICIl VI LIGISIATIVI DLPARTMLNT 
ART1CI F VII EXLCUTH F DI PARTMLNT 
A R l I C i r \ I I I JUDICIU D1PVRTMLNT 
AKTICU 1 \ CONGRLSSIONAL AND UGISLATIVE 
APPORTIONMI NT 
A R H C I I X IDUCATION 
A R I I C I L X 1 COIAT1LS CITIIS VND TOWNS 
A R I I C I i XII CORPORATIONS 
AKIICIEXII I RIVfNUI \ND TAXATION 
ARTICLE XIV P L i i ' K DEBT 
\ R 1 I C I F XV MII I I IA 
ARTICLF XM I \BOR 
ARIICLI XMI WATLRRIGHIS 
ARIICLLXVIII IOKfcSIRY 
ARTICLE XIX PUBLIC BU1I DINGS AND STATE 
INSTITUTIONS 
ARHCLLXX P U P I I C I A N D S 
ARTICIE XXI S U ARIfS 
ARTIC 11 XXII MISCI LLANLOUS 
ARTIi.LT XXIII AMENDMENT AND REVISION 
ARTICLE XXIV SCHtDLLl 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty Gocl for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and peipet 
uate the principles of free government, do ordain 
and establish this CONS TIT UTiON 1896 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Section 1 {Inherent and inalienable rights ] 
Section 2 { VII political power inherent in the people I 
Section 1 {Utah inseparable from the Union J 
Section 4 [Religious hbert) j 
Section 5 {Habeas corpus J 
Section 6 {Right to bear arms I 
Section 7 (Due process of law { 
Section 8 {Offenses billable 1 
Section 9 {Excessive bail and fines - Cruel punishments ] 
Section 10 {Trial by jury 1 
Section 11 {Courts open Redress of injuries 1 
Section 12 {Rights of accused persons 1 
Section 13 {Prosecution b^ information or indictment -
Grand jur> { 
Section 14 {Unreasonab'e searches forbidden - Issuance of 
warrant J 
Section IS (Trtedom of speech and of the press - I ibel 1 
Settion 16 {No imprisonment for debt Exception } 
Section 17 {Lkctkms to be free Soldiers voting 1 
Section 18 {Attainder Lx post facto laws Impairing 
contracts j 
Section 19 {Treason defined Proo f J 
Section 20 (Military subordinate to the civil power ] 
Section 21 {Sla\ery forbidden J 
Section 22 {Private property for public use J 
Section 23 {Irrevocable franchises forbiudcn ] 
Section 24 {Uniform operation of Jaws J 
Sett ( - 25 {Rights retained b> people 1 
c^c on 26 {Provisions inand lory and prohibitory J 
Section 27 {Fundamental n0 b J 
For ** i"A<ot
 0VSf consult 
Section 1 [Inherent and inalienable rights 1 
All men 1 a\e the inherent and inalienable right to 
erjoy ard defend their lives and liberties to acquire, 
possess and protect property to worship according 
to the dictates of their consciences to assemble 
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances, to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right 1896 
Section 2 {AH political power inherent in the 
people ] 
All po ' i t ical power is inherent in the people and 
all free governments are founded on their aut u Uy 
for their equal protect ion and benefit and they have 
the right to a er or reform their government as the 
public welfare n a> require 1896 
Section 3 [Utah inseparable from the Union ] 
The State of Utah is an n eparable part of the 
Federal Un ion and the C o n s i tut ion of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land 1896 
Section 4 (Religions liberty 1 
T h e rights of conscience sha 1 never be infringed 
Tl A State shall make no law respecting an estabhs 
hment of religion or prohibit ing the free excreise 
thereof, no religious test shall be required as a 
qu^hhca t ion for any office of public trust or for 
an> vote at any election, nor shall any person be 
incompetent as a witness or ju ror on account of 
religious belief or the absence thereof There shall 
be no u^ion of Church and State, nor shall any 
church dominate the State or interfere with its fun 
etions No public money or property shall be appr 
opna t cd for or applied to any religious worsh p 
e v t r u s e or instruction, or for the support of any 
ecclesiastical establishment No property quahfica 
tion lall be required of any person to vote, or hold 
office except as ptovided in this Const i tut ion 1896 
Section 5 [Habeas corpus ] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
not be suspended, ui less, in case of rebellion or 
invasion, the public safety requires it 1896 
Section 6 [Right to bear a rms J 
T h e individual right of the people to keep and 
bear a r m s for security and defense of self, family, 
others, property, or the state as well as for other 
lawful purposes shall not be infringed but nothing 
herein srnll prevent the Legislature from defining 
the lawful use of arms 1985 
Section 7 fOue process of law ] 
N o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
p rope r ty , wi thout due process of law 1896 
Section 8 [Offenses bailable 1 
All pr isoners shall be bailable by sufficient sure 
ties, except for capi tal offenses when the p r o o f is 
evident or the p re sumpt ion s t rong or where a person 
is accused of the commiss ion of a felony while on 
p roba t ion or paro le or while free on bail awai t ing 
trial on a previous felonv c l n r g e , and where the 
proof is evidci t or the p resumpt ion s t rong 1973 
Section 9 [Excessive bail and fines - Cruel 
pun i shmen t s } 
Excessive bail shall not be required , excessive 
fines si all no t be imposed nor shall cruel and 
unusua l pun i shments be inflicted Persons arrested 
or impr isoned s1 ai no* treated with unnecessary 
rigor 1896 
Section 10 [Trial ^v jurj J 
In c pif»I cas^s the right of trial by j ir> shall 
remain inviolate In courts of general jurisdiction, 
exempt in C T t^l cas«s a jury sln'l consist of e cht 
j \ rors In courts of inferior juisdiction a jurv shall 
>E®C<Vs Annota t on Service 3 9 3 
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consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of 
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. i89<s 
Section 11. {Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open , and every person, fo; an 
injury done to him in his pe r son , proper ty or repu-
tat ion, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be admmiste ied without denial or unn-
ecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel , any civil cause to 
which he is a par ty . 1896 
Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against h im, to have compulsory process 
to compel the a t tendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
ju ry of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been commit ted , and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any recused 
person, belore final judgment , be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. 1 lie accused shall not be compelled to 
gv e evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband , nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. i m 
Section 13. [Prosecution by information or 
indictment - Grand jury.] 
Offences heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, 
unk^s the examination be waived by the accused 
with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with 
or without such examination and commitment. The 
formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof sha!' be as prescribed by the Legisla-
ture. 1949 
Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -
Issuance of warrant . ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreas-
onable searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or aff irmation, particularly des-
cribing the place to be searched, and the peison or 
thing to be seized. 1896 
Section 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press -
Libel.] -
No law shall be passed to abridge or restra 'n the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal 
prosecutions for libel the t ruth may be given in 
evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the 
jury that the mat ter charged as libelous is true, and 
was published with good motives, and for justifiable 
ends, the party shall be acquit ted; and the jury shall 
have the right to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Section 16. [No imprisonment for debt -
Exception.] ; 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors . im 
Section 17. [Elections to be free - Soldiers voting,] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in 
tiii.e of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or 
394 For Annotations, consult Co; 
out of the State, under regulations to be prescribed 
by law. MM 
Section 18. [Attainder - Ex post facto laws -
Impairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
:rnpairing the obligation of contracts shall be 
passed. im 
Section 19. [Treason defined - Proof.] 
Treason agnmst the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall 
be convicted of treason unless on the testiiAony of 
two witnesses to the same overt act. u% 
Section 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. n% 
Section 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State. 18% 
Section 22 . [Private p roper ty for public use.] 
Pr ivate p roper ty shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use wi thout just compensa t ion . im 
Section 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity. u% 
Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. \m 
Section 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny othc i s retained by the people. u% 
Section 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are 
declared to be otherwise. 1896 
Section 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is 
essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government. n% 
ARTICLE II. STATE BOUNDARIES 
Section I. [State boundaries.] 
The boundaries of the State of Utah shall be as 
follows: 
Bann ing at a point formed by the intersection of 
the thirty-second degree of longitude west from 
Washington, with the thirty-seventh degree of 
north latitude; thence due west along said thirty-
seventh degree of north latitude to the intersection 
of the same with the thirty-seventh degree of lon-
gitude wcsf from Washington; thence due north 
along said thirty-seventh degree of west longitude 
to the intersection of the same with the forty-
second degree of north latitude; thence due east 
along said forty-second degree of north latitude to 
the intersection of the same with the thirty-fourth 
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence 
due south along said thirty-fourth degree of west 
longitude to the intersection of the same with the 
forty-first degree of north latitude; thence due east 
along said forty-first degree of north latitude to 
the intersection of the same with the thirty-second 
•E* v^u s Annate * .*m Scrvj^c itovu.u^ . 
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Respondent Laura Barker's Brief to each of the 
following: Michael R. Barker, Pro Se, Box 142, Santa Clara, 
Utah 84765, Blaine R. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 2^ 6 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and Ross C. 
Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney, Sanpete County Courthouse, 
Manti, Utah 84642, this %*? day of December, IQ87. 
xj ^ -Y^s^Cx -
